Приглашаем на совместный семинар ЛИСОМО РЭШ и МЦИИР ВШЭ, объединенный с Семинаром НИУ ВШЭ по политической экономике.
Спикер: Димитриос Зефтерис (Университет Кипра), тема доклада: “Implementation by vote-buying mechanisms" (совместно с Йоном Эгвия).
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Краткое описание исследования:
Simple majority voting does not allow preference intensities to be expressed. A vote-buying mechanism, instead, permits preference intensities to be revealed since each agent can buy any quantity of votes x to cast for an alternative of her choosing at a cost c(x) and the outcome is the most voted alternative. In the context of binary decisions, we characterize the class of choice rules implemented by vote-buying mechanisms. Rules in this class can assign any weight to preference intensities and to the number of supporters for each alternative.